Uncharted Rebellion: The Shifting Frontiers of Left-Wing Extremism
For readers of Baku Dialogues, a journal dedicated to fostering intellectual exchange across the Silk Road region, the study of left‑wing extremism (LWE) offers a lens into global ideological currents that resonate even in this historically rich and geopolitically and geoeconomically significant area. The Silk Road region, stretching from the South Caucasus to Central Asia, has long been a crossroads of cultures, ideas, and political movements. Today, it faces many of the same challenges of radicalization and extremism that afflict other parts of the world, though often in unique local forms.
Today, the Silk Road region faces many of the same challenges of radicalization and extremism that afflict other parts of the world, though often in unique local forms.
While much attention in security discourse has focused on right‑wing and Islamist extremism, left‑wing extremism remains under‑examined, despite its evolving presence and potential to influence social and political stability. This paper explores the shifting dynamics of LWE, a phenomenon that, while less studied, is no less relevant to understanding the ideological battles shaping modern countries— including those belonging to the Silk Road region—where anti‑state sentiments, extreme environmental activism, and resistance to technological overreach could find fertile ground amid rapid development and historical grievances.
A recent academic inquiry into the state of research on counterterrorism and violent extremism noted that left‑wing extremism was “largely ignored” by researchers, with respondents identifying this gap as significant. The under‑researched nature of LWE stems from several factors.
First, insufficient research on LWE derives from a historical focus on right‑wing extremism. The politics of memory, as studied by Western scholars, plays a key role here. The historical experience of fascism and Nazism, and the way their legacies are portrayed in collective memory, have convinced many that extremism from the right poses the most destructive threat to the stability of liberal democracies. This construction of collective memory, portraying right‑wing extremism as the ultimate, dangerous “Other,” facilitates the perception of left‑wing extremism as a lesser evil—justifying comparatively less attention and resources devoted to its study.
Second, ideological biases and priorities within Western academia and government bureaucracies influence the allocation of resources and focus on certain types of extremism over others. In the case of LWE, the rationale in those circles is that its self‑designated values—such as anti‑discrimination, anti‑racism, and anti‑fascism—are more aligned with the values of wider society than those of other extremisms.
Since they are seen as radicalizing a Western society’s core values rather than clashing with them, LWE is accepted as inherently less threatening. This deduction reinforces a more lenient view of left‑wing extremist manifestations—which may not even be perceived as extremist by many Western or Western‑influenced researchers—and justifies practitioners demoting it in the hierarchy of democratic and security threats.
Third, this research imbalance stems from perceptions of a reduced threat. In the last decades of the twentieth century—especially between the 1960s and 1980s—leftwing, anti‑colonial, and anti‑imperialist political violence was rampant in the West and the developing world, often described as the “third wave” of terrorism. Compared to that period, the threat and lethality of left‑wing armed resistance today seem to have faded, along with their revolutionary ideological origins steeped in various interpretations of Marxism as well as one thread of the legacy of communist statecraft, namely the export of revolution through violent means.
The quasi‑absence, especially in Western democracies, of abductions, bank robberies, hijackings, bombings, and murder campaigns help explain the limited attention from researchers and practitioners from the turn of the century to the present day. The widespread sentiment is that LWE is not as pressing a topic as it once was. This disregard has generated a significant blind spot regarding features of left‑wing extremism, such as intimate knowledge of its milieus, internal dynamics, discourses, drivers of radicalization, and violent manifestations.
Arguably, this asymmetry between research on LWE and other forms of extremism might be justifiable given data showing that contemporary left‑wing groups and networks have been less lethal than right‑wing and Islamist groups in terms of political violence. However, a broader analysis—including violence during mass protests, riots, site evictions, confrontations with law enforcement, and physical targeting of political rivals—reveals a more serious scope of left‑wing political violence. This includes injuries, particularly to police officers and ideological opponents, rather than just fatalities.
The notion advanced by some scholars that “far‑left violence is mostly about property” as a justification for less scrutiny should not obscure the reality of non‑lethal violence or the possibility that lethal violence could reemerge or intensify in the near future. Moreover, the neglect of LWE as a subject of study has left many non‑violent dimensions unexplored, such as vocal extremism and its consequences for sowing division, disillusionment, and extremism, and otherwise affecting the public sphere.
This neglect has been more pronounced in universities and social sciences departments throughout the West than in Western think tanks or intelligence agencies, which have tracked the phenomenon over the years. However, the Western academic landscape appears to be shifting, which will likely affect developments in academia in the rest of the world. An increasing number of scholars, mostly based in the West, are examining extremism on the left, with notable developments such as the publication of the first academic handbook on left‑wing extremism in 2023 and a spike in studies addressing both its ideological and non‑ideological drivers.
A Vast Landscape
Before exploring current trends in left‑wing extremism, one last issue warrants consideration: its definitional complexity. LWE encompasses a variety of ideological trends and belief systems, a challenge that has only intensified since the turn of the century. Traditionally, it has been divided into two major branches: communism and anarchism, with sub‑varieties in between. Both, in different ways, strive for a utopian new order of a free community of equals, clashing with the world as it exists.
This landscape has grown more complex in the twenty‑first century with the rise in the West of a new Identitarian left, driven by a radical‑progressive ideology fixated on marginalized identities based on race, gender, and sexual orientation. At its core lies an intersectional battle against what is seen by its proponents as an oppressive system that must be dismantled. This multiplicity of causes, often pursued simultaneously, amplifies the diversity and fluidity of LWE milieus.
With this rapidly evolving landscape in mind, what follows is a condensed overview of the major drivers and trends in contemporary LWE and potential new directions.
Directions in Left‑Wing Extremism
Not all possible trends are covered here, but rather the most dominant and often interrelated ones. Some represent a continuation or intensification of older dynamics, while others have emerged in response to new societal and technological developments.
For clarity, they are grouped under three main categories of struggle (ideological‑political ‘wars,’ culture ‘wars,’ and civilizational ‘wars’) though these struggles frequently intertwine.
Ideological‑political wars come in the following sub‑categories: the anti‑state / anti‑police duo, militant antifascism (or “Antifa”), and several others. Each will be surveyed in turn.
Anti‑state militancy can be included under a broader definition of anti‑government extremism (AGE), a term that researchers have typically applied to right‑wing extremism, but which is equally relevant here. A defining feature of LWE has been its rejection of the state as violent, tyrannical, and evil—an authoritarian and exploitative system beyond redemption, seen as the source of systemic and civilizational crises where force against it is often deemed legitimate.
LWE encompasses a variety of ideological trends and belief systems, a challenge that has only intensified since the turn of the century.
A recent Europol trend report highlighted that government agencies and their personnel are primary targets for left‑wing and anarchist extremists. Closely tied to this is a deep‑seated sentiment against the police, often viewed as the “attack dogs” of the system. A 2021 report focused on EU member states noted that clashes with police—whether during mass protests, demonstrations against political opponents, or evictions of squatters—are a key driver of far‑left radicalization. Attacks on off‑duty police officers have also occurred.
This confrontation is often expressed through radicalized collective protests and street battles, epitomized by the direct‑action tactic of Black Blocs, where targets include state and corporate property as well as police personnel. In France, where Black Bloc tactics have been prominent in anti‑government protests, a National Gendarmerie report observed that the most common slogans used by militants express hatred of the state, law enforcement, and capitalism.
However, this anti‑state stance can, in certain contexts, adopt a nuanced form when the state appears to align against left‑wing extremists’ adversaries. In such cases, these groups strategically operate under the state’s umbrella, exploiting mechanisms that target their ideological opponents to advance their own agenda.
In the United Kingdom, the non‑crime hate incident (NCHI) framework, which records perceived hostile acts without criminal charges, risks incentivizing left‑wing extremism. Its low evidential threshold—relying on subjective perceptions of prejudice—enables activists to weaponize reports against right‑wing figures, prompting police visits to their homes despite no crime. High‑profile cases, like Harry Miller’s 2019 NCHI for “transphobic” tweets, highlight this potential for abuse. In 2020, a British judge condemned the practice, stating, “In this country we have never had a Cheka, a Gestapo, or a Stasi. We have never lived in an Orwellian society.” Such measures may embolden groups like Antifa to escalate from reporting to direct actions, perceiving state support for their “anti‑hate” agenda.
Militant anti‑fascism, or “Antifa,” is another major driver of LWE. This decentralized social movement blends communists, socialists, and anarchists in a self‑designated countermovement aimed at resisting and defeating fascism through violence. Antifa operates through both street activism—using confrontational violence against far‑right protests, gatherings, and individuals—and digital activism, such as “doxing” to disclose private information of farright activists, aiming to silence and stigmatize them.
The Antifa proclivity for street violence, visible in settings from the United States to Western Europe and even Brazil, gained prominence during events like the 2020 protests and riots driven by the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in the U.S., where a study showed the presence of Antifa elements significantly increased the risk of violence.
Some researchers describe the violence perpetrated by Antifa elements as “reactive,” “restrained,” or even ethical, arguing it is justified as self‑defense against the greater evil of fascism. However, this view overlooks the conceptual stretching of “fascism” into a blanket term denouncing any group or movement deemed hostile to the militants’ communist, anarchist, or radically socialist worldview, weakening the anti‑fascist justification for violence.
For clarity, left‑wing extremism trends are grouped under three main categories of struggle (ideological‑political ‘wars,’ culture ‘wars,’ and civilizational ‘wars’) though these struggles frequently intertwine.
The notion of controlled violence also fails to account for numerous injuries to police and ideological opponents or instances where Antifa activists have used lethal weaponry. In Germany, for example, authorities have issued successive alerts about well‑organized left‑wing extremist violence, with the head of the Berlin Agency for the Protection of the Constitution warning that such groups would not shy away from killing if necessary.
In 2023, the national president of the same agency noted an unrestrained escalation of LWE violence against state power and political opponents, raising concerns about potential terrorist structures emerging. This has included physical assaults on Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) members, arson, property destruction, and even online “death lists” of AfD politicians with bomb‑making instructions. In 2023, members of the “Hammer Gang,” a left‑wing extremist group with a prominent female leader, received prison sentences for violent attacks on right‑wing extremists, causing significant injuries.
In France, too, Antifa faces judicial scrutiny, as authorities target groups perceived to engage in violent antifascist activism, prompting defenses from far‑left political allies. In 2025, the French interior minister announced a procedure to potentially dissolve the Jeune Garde, an antifascist group founded in 2018 and active in seven cities with over 100 members. Authorities accuse the group of violent attacks on farright activists, citing “Antifasquad” Telegram posts and a 2024 Paris metro assault.
This trend also reflects cumulative extremism, where the rise of one form of extremism catalyzes others to counter it, often spiraling into violence. In the U.S., the growth of the White nationalist Alt‑Right spiked Antifa militancy, visible during the 2020 BLM riots. In Western Europe, rising far‑right support creates a “state of emergency” in the Antifa mindset, though the intensity of this reciprocal radicalization varies by country.
Yet, it cannot be overstated that Antifa’s anti‑state ideology is not absolute and can shift when the state targets their far‑right adversaries, transforming it into a perceived ally. In such instances, left‑wing extremists leverage state actions to justify and amplify their militant campaigns.
In Germany, the May 2025 decision by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV ) to label the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)—the country’s largest opposition party—as a “confirmed right‑wing extremist endeavor” could spur left‑wing extremism. Although the BfV claimed it had gathered “definitive evidence” in making the determination, less than a week later its officials suspended the classification while a court case continues and instead labeled AfD a “suspected case.” As both classifications enable surveillance and may signal state‑sanctioned targeting of AfD (including cuts to state funding for its political activities), this could embolden Antifa and similar groups to escalate attacks on its members. Perceiving this as tacit approval, left‑wing extremists might intensify street confrontations or digital harassment, viewing AfD’s marginalization as justification for militant anti‑fascist actions.
Four additional trends bear mentioning in this context. First, off‑the‑grid clandestine LWE cells may reemerge in response to increased state repression, with signs of this in Germany.
Second, Antifa violence could spill across borders, as seen in 2023 when foreign Antifa militants, some linked to Germany’s Hammer Gang, attacked perceived neo‑Nazis in Budapest. The German and Italian citizens that were involved in these assaults faced varied outcomes: some received prison sentences, others face ongoing trials in Hungary and Germany, and one of the Italians, elected to the European Parliament on Italy’s Green‑Left Alliance list, gained immunity. The alleged German leader, accused of orchestrating the attacks, remains at large.
Third, foreign fighters with combat experience abroad—such as a German citizen who fought in Syria and assaulted right‑wing extremists, or a French citizen with Syrian links sentenced in Paris for leading a “terrorist conspiracy” against the state—represent a growing concern, though data remains scarce.
Fourth, broader anti‑system goals are increasingly inserted into specific intersectional protests, such as the U.S. coalition against “Cop City” in Georgia, advocating extreme anti‑police messages, or the storming of a Tesla factory near Berlin by activists aiming to “overcome” capitalism.
Beyond Europe, a wave of vandalism and arson attacks, prominent in early 2025, targeted Tesla vehicles, dealerships, and charging stations, particularly in the United States but also in Canada, reflecting a fusion of anti‑corporate and anti‑system sentiments prevalent in LWE milieus. These incidents, which escalated following Elon Musk’s appointment to lead the U.S. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) under the new Trump Administration, reflect a fusion of anti‑corporate and anti‑system sentiments prevalent in LWE milieus. Within the LWE framework, these attacks align with broader anti‑capitalist and anti‑technological narratives, targeting Tesla as a symbol of corporate power and Musk as an influential political figure who has become associated with the Trump Administration, which LWE deplore.
Culture Wars
Culture “wars”—struggles over values, ideals, and the sociocultural future of societies— have long fueled polarization and extremism in the West and elsewhere. Today, a major cleavage revolves around the rise of a left‑Identitarian movement, often termed “Wokeness,” identified by some scholars as a potential driver of LWE.
This belief system operates within a Manichean framework of good versus evil, uplifting historically marginalized groups while opposing a hegemonic system of oppressive forces like systemic racism, white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity. This mindset fosters a desire for purification, expressed in efforts to dismantle educational systems, cultural heritage, and monuments, and to censor or cast out adversaries.
These traits reflect monism—a dogmatic thought pattern where everything stems from one simple truth, and dissent is invalid—as well as features shared by both right‑ and left‑wing authoritarianism, such as moral absolutism, preference for social uniformity, prejudice toward outsiders, and punitiveness toward enemies. This mental attitude increases the potential for political violence, moving beyond intimidation into physical attacks against the system and its supporters.
Emerging trends include violent advocacy for pro‑transgender policies, with signs in extreme transgender activism like a notable presence in Antifa street confrontations, online calls for a “trans day of vengeance,” and instances like the fatal shooting at a Nashville Christian school by a trans individual, justified by the Trans Resistance Network as a response to the perceived “genocidal eradication” of trans people in America.
Civilizational Wars
Civilization “wars” come in two basic forms: climate activism and technology. Climate activism, though heterogeneous, intersects with left‑wing extremist ideas and practices, including efforts to sway climate protection protests.
Eco‑extremism, or violence to protect the environment, has a decades‑long history but has remained marginal. Recent years, however, have seen the rise of eco‑apocalyptic movements like Fridays for Future, Extinction Rebellion, Last Generation, and Just Stop Oil, which adopt desperate, confrontational approaches to avert climate catastrophe.
These groups focus on non‑violent disruptive tactics—blockades, traffic obstruction, and vandalizing art—but authorities have cracked down on their illegal activities, with prison sentences issued in 2023 and France briefly dissolving the collective Les Soulèvements de la Terre over eco‑terrorism claims, a decision later annulled.
Within these groups, vanguardist thinking— self‑representation as an epistemologically privileged group with exclusive access to truth and a mission of ecological salvation—poses risks to democracy. Proposals from groups like Last Generation for climate governing bodies to rule populations and curtail freedoms undermine popular sovereignty. The coupling of anti‑pluralism with anti‑constitutionalism could break down democratic order.
Additionally, apocalypticism fosters a “last resort” mentality, with eco‑terrorism seen as the only solution. A founder of Germany’s Ende Gelände, classified as leftwing extremist by Berlin’s Office for the Protection of the Constitution, predicted a more militant movement cycle, potentially resembling a “Green RAF,” akin to the Red Army Faction terrorist group of the 1970s‑1990s.
Similar dynamics appear in the U.S. with eco‑guerrilla networks like Deep Green Resistance, reflecting climate change as an ideological driver of terrorism and a “threat multiplier” in security research.
Another front targets technology itself. Anticivilizationism equates the techno‑industrial system with evil, uniting primitivists, radical environmentalists, and insurrectionary anarchists inspired by Ted “Unabomber” Kaczynski’s 1995 manifesto on technology’s destabilizing effects, titled “Industrial Society and Its Future.”
Today, critical infrastructures— power lines, pipelines, railways, and 5G networks—are targeted through sabotage and arson as part of a campaign against the “machine world.” In the 2020s, Europol’s TE‑SAT reports—annual assessments of terrorism trends in the EU based on member state data— have consistently highlighted the increasing focus of left‑wing and anarchist extremists on digital society, advanced technologies, and 5G infrastructure.
Beyond physical attacks, cyber disruptions are also possible. A recent U.S. Homeland Security assessment warned of emerging technologies like AI enabling new destructive methods against critical infrastructure. Anti‑technology terrorism could extend to humans, as seen in Kaczynski’s bombing campaign and later actions like the Mexican group Individualists Tending Toward the Wild targeting bio‑nanotechnology scientists, or an Italian anarchist leader’s call from prison to maximize damage to the “megamachine,” including its human operators.
Waves of the Future
The late David Rapoport, a renowned U.S. scholar of political violence, had pondered whether the recent surge in rightwing terrorism might herald a “global Fifth Wave” of terrorism. Yet, the next wave may prove far more complex and ideologically tangled than those of the past, propelled by digital acceleration and a growing tendency toward a “mix and match” approach to ideologies, rather than the uniform adoption seen historically.
This shift fragments extremism into looser networks, lone actors, and hybrid ideologies, reshaping the terrain of radicalization. For leftwing extremism, this transformation is particularly evident in the “civilizational wars” embraced by many activists, united by a shared collapsist vision. They see an ongoing collapse—driven by climate apocalypse and the techno‑industrial system—as a call to dismantle the current order. This narrative cuts across traditional left‑right divides, opening the door to fluid convergences among diverse individuals and groups, each with differing post‑collapse visions but aligned in their declinist outlook and chaotic tactics. The fact that Kaczynski garners admiration from both eco‑guerrillas and eco‑fascists exemplifies this unlikely alignment, hinting at future possibilities.
Beyond the West, where these dynamics are most documented, states in the Silk Road region and elsewhere could draw comparative lessons from this ideological fluidity, as local grievances and global influences might similarly blur boundaries and spawn unexpected alliances. Ultimately, the interplay of technology, environment, and collapse holds the potential not only to escalate far‑left extremism but also to forge strange new coalitions, redefining the terrorist waves yet to come.
The resurgence of left‑wing extremism, with its hybridized ideologies spanning antifascism, anti‑technology sabotage, and intersectional radicalism, demands not only further research on what admittedly is a complex and fast‑moving environment but also adaptive counterterrorism frameworks to ensure the stability of states and regions.
