Sharks in the Muddy Waters: Terrorism and Mounting Global Disorder
The international system is in increasing disarray, thanks partly to systemic and structural factors. The strategic competition between major powers and groups of states is growing sharply. One particular consequence of this process is an escalation in scale and scope of shooting wars and armed conflicts (e.g., in Europe and the Middle East) and other antagonisms on the edge of war (e.g., Taiwan, the South China Sea, and South Asia).
Moreover, the existing geopolitical alignments are shifting oddly. Neo‑revisionism, expansionist foreign policies, and advanced territorial claims militarize international relations. With a reoccurrence of “utility of force,” the standing norms of international law are frying, and WMD proliferation regimes and arms control treaties are crumbling. Trade wars and deteriorating growth prospects are increasing strains and risks to the global economy and individual states. Political and ideological polarization in societies, institutional decay, inefficiency of elites, and the rise of populism affect states’ stability. The challenges of climate change and emerging technologies remain unanswered and unsettled.
The combination of the aforementioned underlying factors, together with others, is fracturing the existing world order and producing uncertainty, volatility, and security meltdowns. In an environment in which state actors get fixated on the most coercive concerns—which are related both to accelerating global rivalry and the return of classical geopolitics—other imperative factors could remain in the shadows.
One of these is the phenomenon of terrorism. That phenomenon persisted at the very center of the international security agenda for almost two decades after Al‑Qaeda’s 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S.‑led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the proliferation of global jihadist networks, and the advent of the homegrown terrorism anomaly in the West. However, by the end of the 2010s, there was less evidence of terrorist activity on the strategic radar screen, especially after the fall of the “caliphate” proclaimed by the Islamic State (IS, formerly the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” or ISIS) in the Middle East. Furthermore, the start of the European War in February 2022 and the growing antagonism between revisionist and status‑quo major powers caused the latter grouping to reorganize security priorities, efforts, and resources.
However, the terrorist menace endures in the back of the evolving grand picture. What is more, it indicates signs of renewal and yields strategic effects. The October 2023 mega‑attack by Hamas against Israel from the Gaza Strip—a territory that it has completely controlled since 2006, a year after Israel’s disengagement— released the current cycle of the Mid‑Eastern War whilst becoming a sobering warning that the threat posed by terrorists and other violent non‑state actors remains clear and present. The gravity and outreach of such actors fluctuate, ranging from those with trans‑regional networks (like Al‑Qaeda and the Islamic State) and powerful, well‑defined, and weaponized sub‑state movements (like Hezbollah and Hamas) to small underground terrorist cells and individual self‑radicalized “lone wolves” that lack a structural affiliation.
The terrorist menace endures in the back of the evolving grand picture. What is more, it indicates signs of renewal and yields strategic effects.
Nevertheless, the particular singularity of the current period is that the cumulative worldwide disorder and antagonism not only induces a resurgence of terrorism‑related dynamics in different parts of the world, but it can also potentially integrate violent non‑state actors into the pattern of the developing strategic competition between major powers. In that context, the terrorism factor could hypothetically reemerge as a “utility tool” of major powers, as was the case during much of the Cold War.
This essay aims to help the reader navigate the current dynamics in the realm of terrorism. It focuses on the status and conditions of the terrorist threat in different regions of the world, including Russia, Afghanistan, Syria, the West, and the Global South. In addition, it analyzes the general trends in the field, including the potential re‑emergence of the state‑terror nexus and other influencing factors in the context of global antagonism.
Russia
On 22 March 2024, a group of Islamist terrorists struck the Crocus City Hall entertainment complex on the outskirts of Moscow. In total, 145 people were killed and over 550 were wounded in a shooting spree and premeditated arson fire. Noteworthy, the Kremlin dismissed warning intelligence indicators of the imminent terrorist attack in Russia, transmitted by the U.S. government, and the response of the law enforcement agencies at the moment of the incident was sluggish. Although the Islamic State promptly claimed responsibility for the action, the Russian authorities tried to divert the public’s focus to what it alleged was an “Ukrainian footprint” in the massacre.
The details and circumstances of the Crocus attack reflect two intersecting trends that were forming in Russia in past years and then further aggravated by more than three years of war in Ukraine.
The first trend is migration. The demographic composition of Russia alters, and the ongoing war in Ukraine accelerates the transformative tendency. Hundreds of thousands of men were mobilized or volunteered for the war (and tens of thousands have been killed or injured). Scores left the country. As a result, the national labor force erodes and requires more hands. The Russian government tries to bridge the workforce gap by bringing in hundreds of thousands of immigrants, primarily from the Central Asian states and, more recently, from some countries of the Global South. There is no stable data on the number of new immigrants: estimates range from three and four to six million. The majority of them are ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz.
Like in many other countries, newly arrived immigrants (synonyms in use include migrants and temporary residents) to Russia face an alien cultural environment, with many residing in adverse living and working conditions. In addition to low pay and daily travails, migrant communities in Russia remain under strict state control, including frequent police raids and arbitrary treatment by the authorities. Cultural frictions with the indigenous population produce societal tensions and have resulted in the radicalization of both immigrants and Russian nationalists. Over 60 percent of Russian citizens view labor migrants through a negative lens, and certain segments of the elite tend to capitalize on the issue of “countering the problem of migration” for political ends.
Against this background, temporary resident communities in Russia have turned into a “state within a state.” Their compartmentalization, coupled with subpar living conditions, has enabled the establishment of a permissive environment for the radicalization of certain segments of the migrant population. Many of the foreigners who arrive in Russia have been radicalized already; others become exposed to radicalization on the spot. In March 2025, the Russian National Security Council identified some 700,000 newcomers as “illegals,” indicating that an unspecified number of these and other categories of migrants pose a “special risk.”
It is difficult to believe that terror entrepreneurs are not trying to tap further into such a vast potential pool of recruits. The recruiters of the Islamic State in the Khorasan Province (IS‑KP)—the regional affiliate of the globalized Islamic State terrorist‑jihadist network—have already penetrated the Central Asian migrant communities in Russia. Their objective is to link certain individuals’ frustration and discontent with violent action through instruments of radicalization. The 2024 Crocus episode clearly demonstrates that terror recruitment propaganda works: the perpetrators were ethnic Tajik migrant workers.
The second parallel trend is the demographic growth of Russia’s indigenous Muslim population. If there were some 25 million Muslims in 2018, nowadays that number is even greater, given this diverse community’s high birth rate. Moreover, the socioeconomic conditions of most of the predominantly Muslim regions are adverse. For instance, Dagestan is an economically depressed province affected by high unemployment, poor living conditions, corruption, and ethnic clanship politics. On that background, the trajectory of Islamization is ascending.
One of the side consequences of that tendency is a steadily increasing challenge of radicalization and self‑radicalization in certain segments of society. Uneducated and unemployed young people with no feasible life perspectives attend underground mosques (there are over 2,500 mosques in Dagestan— twice as many as there are schools, technical and vocational colleges, and higher education institutions). Radicalization takes place through many channels, such as hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca, studies in madrassas (religious schools) located in the Middle East, on‑the‑spot activities of Islamic charities, and, most of all, via Islamist online social media channels. The war in Gaza has also resulted in a radicalization pipeline; in November 2023, anti‑Jewish riots vandalized the Mahachkala International Airport in Dagestan. There and elsewhere, self‑organized vigilant groups enforce a strict Islamist dress code among tourists from other (nonMuslim) parts of Russia. Such and similar groups also form the nucleus of various social protests that are becoming more frequent in Dagestan.
The radicalization trend is precipitating the resurgence of homegrown terrorism. For instance, on 24 June 2024, a group of terrorists attacked a church, a synagogue, and police in the towns of Mahachkala and Derbent in Dagestan. The attack toll was 20 people killed and 46 wounded.
The authorities try to counter the radicalization, but not will full success. The official “palace Muftis” are not as popular among the younger generation influenced by exiled radical online preachers. Furthermore, some who belong to the regional elites covertly support extremists in the context of clan politics by providing them with covert material support and shelter.
There are four trends to watch concerning the homegrown terrorist threat in Russia. Three of them are due to the delayed impact of the ongoing war in Ukraine and geopolitical competition.
First, the incarceration system represents a particular concern for the Russian authorities. Many inmates (both indigenous and migrant Muslims, as well as converts to Islam) are exposed to radicalization behind bars. The jail jamaats (cohesive communities with their own strict code of conduct) produce nuclei of future teambuilding and consolidated connections at large. The hostage‑taking incidents and riot attempts in Russian jails in the summer of 2024 underscore a degree of prison radicalization.
Second, the factor of the war eventually would have a significant aggravating impact on the security environment, given the influx of a massive cohort of seasoned veterans and the circulation of weapons and explosives from the battle zone. Those returnees who fail to fit back into civilian life could end up joining extremist groups (whether of the Islamist or Russian nationalist variety). One potential outcome may be that the North Caucasus—primarily Chechnya and Dagestan— relapses again into terrorist violence, as was the case in the 1990s and 2000s. Another hypothetical effect could be the emergence of politically motivated violence in different parts of Russia. Additionally, the large number of migrants who are recruited to join the Russian army fighting in Ukraine may cause instability in their home countries upon their return.
Third, the war is overstretching Russia’s security services and law enforcement agencies, diverting their focus and resources from countering terrorist threats to war‑related missions (such as reacting to Ukraine’s subversion campaign against war‑related targets). According to official data, in 2024 there were 1,191 “terrorist” attacks of all kinds (compared to 410 in 2023), most of which were related either to Ukraine’s actions, or to violent anti‑war protests. Multitasking leaves more loopholes in the security system, which terrorist actors could exploit for their own purposes. The paradox is that heightened securitization does not necessarily mean heightened security.
Fourth, to attain its geopolitical ends, Moscow has increased discrete contacts with certain violent sub‑state actors, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Ansarallah. Moreover, Russia decriminalized the Taliban in April 2025 by removing it from its list of terrorist organizations. All that is seen as a “red flag” for the global Islamic State (IS) network, which considers the mentioned movements as competitors (particularly through the lens of Sunni‑Shia rivalry). The ISKhorasan Province regional branch that challenges the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan is especially irritated, as seen from its statements. In addition, the previous Russian way of war in Syria, which as a rule did not make use of precision weapons, and, more broadly, its support of the now‑defunct Assad regime remain in the jihadist propaganda narratives. All that motivates and incentivizes potential vengeance terrorist attacks in Russia. The bombing of the Russian embassy in Kabul in September 2022 was ISKP’s warning.
Overall, in the observable perspective, the long war in Ukraine and its multiple effects could produce conditions that can potentially revitalize the terrorist threat inside Russia.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan is reemerging as a center of gravity in the context of the terrorist threat in the Silk Road region, broadly understood, and South Asia. The collapse of the West‑supported government and the return of the Taliban rule in 2021 created a security vacuum. The Taliban tends to perform now as a more or less reasonable actor regarding its external affairs. However, it has failed to stabilize the country and does not fully control all of Afghanistan’s territory. Continuing chaos in the lawless areas breeds a nurturing environment for terrorist outfits operating under the umbrella of IS‑KP, which acts as a centripetal magnet for local actors distressed by Taliban rule. In particular, the Pashtu‑Tajik ethnic row has caused elements of the latter group to gravitate to IS‑KP.
Currently, IS‑KP represents the most able regional cluster of the Islamic State that has remained active since the disintegration of the IS “caliphate” at the end of the 2010s. Its capabilities are further reinforced now by a migration of extremist elements from Syria. While fighting with the Taliban government forces, IS‑KP is probably attempting to expand the area of control in order to reincarnate, in one form or another, the “caliphate” that was defeated in the Middle East. If it succeeds, parts of Afghanistan can turn into a terrorist “black hole” that projects domino‑effect threats to the Central Asian states, Iran, Russia, China’s XinjiangUyghur region, and the South Asian countries.
The activities of the terrorist outfits on the borders of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan are already visible and pose a threat to the stability of the mentioned states. Afghanistan and Central Asia are merging into a single strategic theatre for IS‑KP. That, in turn, engages Russia in the threat contour and makes the region its “soft underbelly,” providing the migration factor explained above.
Afghanistan and Central Asia are merging into a single strategic theatre for IS‑KP.
Iran is in the special focus of IS‑KP, whose ideological credos include a strong sectarian (anti‑Shia) line. From Afghan territory, the grouping has organized several terrorist attacks against Iranian religious shrines. Notably, these operations made use of recruited Central Asian states’ citizens as suicide bombers. The attack in the Iranian city of Kerman on 3 January 2024—the deadliest terror attack since the 1979 Islamic Revolution—left over 100 people killed and almost 300 injured. The IS‑KP threat projection from Afghanistan remains a hassle for Iran’s government, which concurrently has to fight a proximate tribal terrorist insurgency in the province of Baluchistan, which borders Pakistan.
Syria
The 2023‑2025 war cycles in the Middle East changed the region’s strategic settings. The Hamas October 2023 terror attack from Gaza triggered an overwhelming Israeli response that first depleted the capabilities of Hamas and then of Hezbollah. The eradication of Hezbollah’s military power became one of the main contributing factors to the downfall of Assad’s regime and the takeover of Syria by what some chose to characterize at the time as a moderate Islamist opposition force. The new government has declared its intention to concentrate on the country’s (re‑)building, domestic intercommunity concord, and nonviolent coexistence with Syria’s neighbors.
The declarations and actions of the new regime in Damascus modify currents in the jihadist domain. The 13‑year‑long war in Syria led to the advent of a massive extremist cluster in the ranks of the anti‑Assad opposition. The most radical one is a loose constellation of foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) who migrated to the Levant from all over the world for jihad and caliphate‑building. The current dynamic in the FTF realm is fluid and not too transparent; however, such jihadists are apparently not happy with the course of their leaders, including the rejection of confrontation with Israel and an unwillingness to proceed forthwith with what they call the “liberation” of Jerusalem.
Although some of the migrant jihadists can find a social lift in new conditions and even be promoted within the FTP system, the majority of them cannot return to their home countries for self‑preservation reasons. Therefore, the best that those disenchanted armed elements (both foreign and local in origin) can do is to peel away from the mainstream structural body of the former Islamist opposition turned into a ruling force, and defect to the vestiges of the Islamic State. The latter already shows some indications of a resurgence, especially after the largely unvetted release of thousands of prisoners from Syrian prisons as the ancien régime was collapsing and a new one was taking shape.
This distinctive worry is most associated with the Central Asian, North Caucasian, and ethnic Uyghur outfits operating in Syria. As said, their members can hardly return home, having already been identified by the respective security services of their countries of origin. However, they can relocate to the lawless areas in Afghanistan and nearby Pakistan, and their mere existence and propaganda outreach to target audiences will influence the security environment in their homelands anyway.
In a parallel development, the region’s grand transformation effectually terminated Iran’s strategic project of the “Axis of Resistance,” the framework through which Tehran had previously recruited and deployed to Syria tens of thousands of fighters from the Shia communities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other countries. Some of those combatants have now become “stray dogs” and have diffused, causing trouble in their own countries and beyond.
The sectarian aspect is a supreme peril for Syria’s stability at the current stage. In the March 2025 troubles, “imported” jihadists were behind the most vicious crimes committed against the predominantly Alawite civilian population in the coastal region of Syria, as well as the attacks against members of Christian minorities. Because of a still porous interstate border, sectarian Sunni‑Shia conflict can easily extend (again) to Lebanon. There is also a significant chance that Sunni jihadists will engage in violent confrontations with the well‑armed Kurdish and Druze communities (in fact, the clashes between pro‑government gunmen and Druze self‑defense groups in southern Syria already erupted in early May 2025).
The sectarian aspect is a supreme peril for Syria’s stability at the current stage.
The West
The terrorist threat in the West has its own peculiarities. While in Russia extremists are performing in the collection of scattered autonomous micro‑groups embedded into local or migrant communities, many (would‑be) terrorists based in the West are self‑radicalized and spontaneously activated “lone wolf” (LW) grassroots actors. As far as micro‑groups are concerned, they exist too; the internet, social media, and the free movement of people within the U.S., Canada, and the EU member states that belong to the Schengen zone facilitate their networking. Another distinction is the groups’ composition, which includes first‑generation and second‑generation immigrants (many of whom are unstable, adrenaline rush‑seeking teenagers under the age of 16) and indigenous Muslim converts (who are usually even more radical).
Many (would‑be) terrorists based in the West are self‑radicalized and spontaneously activated “lone wolf” grassroots actors.
In the past two years, the wars in Gaza and Lebanon became a catalyst for many terrorist incidents on the European continent and in North America; in other cases, specific motives were not distinguishable and were probably induced by unceasing Islamic State propaganda. In that period, actual copycat attacks and foiled terrorist plots took place in Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and some other countries.
Most incidents were low‑tech, improvised LW attacks with the use of knives or ramming cars rather than firearms or explosives. In the notable episode, an IS‑inspired former U.S. army veteran drove a car into a crowd in New Orleans on 1 January 2025, killing 15 and injuring 35 people. Some plots aimed at high‑visibility targets and mass casualties: in August 2024, an alert of a likely terrorist attack led to the cancellation of a Taylor Swift concert in Vienna.
Three emerging trends are relevant to the current and prospective terrorist dynamic in the Western world. First, given ascending left‑ and right‑wing populist trends in various EU member states, the heightened risk of terrorism and violent extremism is becoming a sensitive factor with political significance and implications. The knife stabbings in Mannheim and Solingen (May and August 2024, respectively) and the Magdeburg car attack (December 2024) apparently contributed to the record‑high result of the Alternative for Germany political party in the February 2025 federal elections (its platform contains, inter alia, anti‑mass immigration provisions, and the party was classified as an “extreme far‑right entity” by the country’s federal authorities in May 2025).
Second, although the pro‑Palestinian street and university protests of radical, usually far‑left political movements did not result in the dawn of “global intifada” in the West, they inspired some individuals to commit violent acts. In a somewhat related and disturbing development, Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security reportedly outsourced the Foxtrot criminal network to attack Israeli and Jewish targets in Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Copenhagen. A foiled attack on Israel’s consulate in Munich in September 2024 appears from this series.
Third, the long war in Ukraine has led to a galvanization of alleged Russian hybrid operations against some European countries in order to deter their support for Kyiv. Reports indicate that Moscow is outsourcing individual society dropouts and criminal groups for such kinds of actions. It is possible to suggest that the same logic is potentially applicable to religious extremists and political radicals. Meanwhile, in April 2025, the Islamic State urged its supporters to commit attacks on the soil of Europe “while crusaders are fighting each other.”
Overall, in many European countries, issues of terrorism and (im)migration divide societies and empower radical‑spectrum politicians on both the left and the right. Meanwhile, the risk of politically motivated anti‑migrant, anti‑immigrant, and anti‑establishment counter‑violence as a reaction to potential new attacks and government policies increases. A random event can launch the process, and the meddling of non‑European state actors could aggravate the impact of terrorist acts, should they occur.
Rest of the World
The Global South remains persistently affected by a phenomenon of terrorism in the form of terrorist‑criminal insurgencies. In Africa, the most intensive Islamist terrorist activities take place in the regions of the Sahel, Nigeria, and the Horn of Africa (the poorest areas of the world) and, to a lesser extent, in the northern and central parts of the continent. The insurgent movements operating in the Sahel tend to expand their outreach to the neighboring countries, towards the Gulf of Guinea and Lake Chad.
The Global South remains persistently affected by a phenomenon of terrorism in the form of terrorist‑criminal insurgencies.
Unlike in the West with its urban lone‑wolf actors and small groups, the African terrorist cluster is represented by largescale paramilitary‑type movements (“wolfpacks”), which exploit local systemic (social, economic, and cultural) root causes and draw their strength from the disgruntled segments of the population. Those movements fall under the auspices of two rival jihadist networks (the Islamic State and Al‑Qaeda), who fight not only governments but also each other, competing for hearts, minds, and resources.
The terrorism factor produces perpetual insecurity and arrests the development of several African countries. Furthermore, it creates a permissive environment for the intrusion of foreign state actors, like Russia, which has already replaced one of the continent’s former colonial powers, France, but also the United States, as a security provider in at least six African states.
In the Asia‑Pacific region, Kashmir remains the most active flashpoint of terrorist violence, which projects risks to other parts of Indian territory. The most recent example is the terrorist attack against civilians in the Indiacontrolled part of the region. The activities of Islamist extremist groups and the reciprocal actions of Hindu nationalists could trigger a new vicious cycle of violence, like they did in the past. Other less active or dormant Islamist terrorist groups remain present in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.
In Latin America, terrorist tradecraft blends in with the criminal insurgency wars conducted by narco‑cartels in Mexico, Colombia, and Peru, as well as contiguous countries. Significantly, profit from drug trade and supplementary illicit enterprises are fueling other terrorist outfits’ activities far outside the Western Hemisphere. The most illustrative example is the mutually benefiting symbiosis between Colombian narco‑terrorist organizations and Islamist terror movements in Africa in the transit of drugs to Europe.
Six Observations
There are six general factors related to the phenomenon of terrorism, which need to remain in the field of view at the current stage. One, the status of global jihad. The dynamics in the realm of the Islamic State and Al‑Qaeda are fluid, although in different ways. Both networks have become de facto leaderless, confined to the regional loci, and engaged in rivalry.
Al‑Qaeda’s central core (founders and first‑generation members) all but vanished with the death of Ayman al‑Zawahiri in 2022. Most of its once powerful regional affiliates have weakened or ceased to exist and are waging “war by communiqués” rather than conducting terror operations. However, Al‑Qaeda has already performed its historical mission by creating and progressing the global jihad’s brand.
Since the defeat of the “caliphate” in its physical shape, IS operates in a more decentralized mode. Yet, the ideology behind it is not defeated. Its regional “provinces” are mostly active; in the first half of 2024, they conducted a total of 788 attacks that killed over 3,700 people. The recurrent empowerment of IS in Afghanistan and the Middle East back to the level of a “caliphate” remains a risk probability. One of the most perilous patterns of IS’s current strategy is inciting the sectarian schism in Islam, which it is trying to trigger through terror attacks against Shia targets.
Two, global strategic competition’s effects. The return of a tough geopolitical contest and militarized international behavior increase the likelihood that opposing states and blocs could outsource “bad guys” as their proxies or utility tools to cause direct damage in the context of future hybrid wars. Certain indicators of such use of violent non‑state actors (VNSA) are already visible.
Furthermore, the polarization of Western societies could precipitate a renaissance of political (anti‑establishment) far‑left and far‑right terrorism, which opposite sides would exploit to drive a wedge in societal cleavages akin to or even more damaging than what was accomplished during the Cold War. Another semblance to that period is a transfer of power competition to the Global South (a.k.a., the “Third World”) area in the form of support of proxy non‑state actors.
Additionally, VNSA could act as international security spoilers in the context of strategic competition, provoking confrontations between states: the most recent example is the terrorist attack in the Indian(‑controlled) part of Kashmir in April 2025, which brought India and Pakistan on the verge of war.
Three, fragmentation of the West. The Trump Administration’s “America First” foreign policy posture—which purports to put the country’s redefined national interests above those of its allies whilst no longer making references to upholding the “rulesbased international order”—has undermined not only the Western alliance but also the West’s counterterrorism strategy and procedures.
The American revision of their past commitments to fight terrorism (such as an ongoing decrease of a military footprint in Syria and Iraq) could leave security vacuums in the geographic regions of concern. Besides, the decline of confidence and trust between Western allies complicates their cooperation in the counterterrorism field, especially intelligence data sharing.
Four, the impact of the conflict over Ukraine. The (temporary) end of hostilities would likely result in the release of hundreds of thousands of veterans by both warring sides. Some of those people (perhaps many), who have real combat experience and a potentially deformed psyche, will become available on the global market of violence. Such a development could mark the start of a new wave of terrorism along either political, ethno‑nationalist, or Islamist tracks.
Five, terrorist modus operandi. The securitization of the West, which unfolded after the 9/11 terrorist mega‑attack, generally works in that part of the world. The plethora of measures taken continue to negatively affect terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Police intelligence, video and cyber surveillance, the use of detectors, sensors, and other technological instruments, stricter explosives control, together with many other measures, have made it possible to prevent or deter major terrorist plots on Western territory in the last few years. As noted above, the majority of the recent terrorist incidents were spontaneous attacks on random soft targets with the use of improvised means.
Nonetheless, the threat of distributed military‑style terror attacks in areas playing host to large public gatherings remains. Attacks in Mumbai (2008), Paris (2015), and Kenya (2013‑2019) are pertinent past instances. Such actions fit the IS concept of “cities red with blood” that aim for mass casualties and maximal political and publicity effects.
Tightly knit small groups have executed this type of mission. They consist of well‑trained, battle‑tested, and dedicated cadres (e.g., stormtroopers and suicide operators). Critical infrastructure and sensitive economic targets, such as energy facilities, airports, urban mass transit systems, and the tourism sector, also remain exposed to potential carefully planned attacks.
Six, the technology factor. Instrumental changes in terrorist TTPs could come with the fast progress of robotic warfare developed in recent armed conflicts, primarily in the Ukrainian theater. Modern technologies like aerial unmanned systems, naval uncrewed platforms, or long‑range ballistic missiles will become available to VNSA very soon—if not already (the recent Houthi strikes against international shipping lanes and Israel speak to the latter point). They can be delivered from states or purchased on the free market (as happened with man‑portable air defense systems in the 1970s). Weaponized commercial drones, modified for strike and/or reconnaissance‑surveillance missions, are already in active VNSA use in conflict zones ranging from the Sahel to Myanmar. It will not be long until terrorists start applying harassment drones to target large public gatherings and critical infrastructure nodes. A vast pool of skilled drone operators from currently active war zones around the world is already available, which could make it easier to transfer technology and experience to terrorist actors.
A related concern is the “digital front.” Terrorist actors will soon have access to mission‑planning tools powered by artificial intelligence—again, if not already. In the meantime, the internet serves, even more than before, as an enabler and force multiplier in the field of online radicalization and recruitment, propaganda, fundraising, tactical expertise sharing, and operational coordination, not to mention cyber‑attacks against critical infrastructure.
Second Wind?
Terrorism is a complex and transforming phenomenon that has gone through ebbs and flows throughout history. In the present conditions of global security meltdown, fragmentation of the geopolitical landscape, intensifying strategic competition, and shifting power balances, terrorism can get a second wind after a certain period of relative decline.
In the evolving security environment, “novel” terrorism will likely emerge as being internet‑centric, spatially distributed, techno‑enabled, and partially state‑supported. At the same time, it will continue to gravitate to certain geocultural regions of the world and operate in the framework of countering‑modernity ideological projects. Terrorism will have its chemistry with ongoing wars, armed conflicts, and crises, either performing as a proxy force of one of the involved state parties or an autonomous third party.
Given evolving conditions, relevant state actors (and interstate organizations) will need to consider revising their counterterrorism strategies vis‑à‑vis the new incarnations of this phenomenon. However, it is essential to note that even the most effective strategies and their practical applications will not lead to the complete eradication of the terrorist threat; at best, such measures will mitigate it to an acceptable level.
That being said, even this outcome is presently impossible, given the circumstances. This implies that the “terror sharks” will continue their hunting season in the muddy waters of global instability.
The “terror sharks” will continue their hunting season in the muddy waters of global instability.
