CICA and Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan continues to follow an independent (or multivector or balanced) foreign policy strategy, based on the assessment that it represents the best way to protect and even strengthen its sovereignty. After the liberation of Karabakh, Azerbaijan has increased its efforts in multilateral fora in both Asia and Europe. Consequently, in Baku’s conception, the intergovernmental organization Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), established in 1992 and formalized in 1999, is gaining increasing importance as it seeks to enhance its role in fostering security and peace throughout Asia. 

This paper explores the impact of Azerbaijan’s engagement through CICA, including its ongoing chairmanship (2024‑2026), on its relationships with neighboring countries and, more broadly, its international relations. We aim to understand: How has Azerbaijan’s active involvement in CICA helped it strengthen ties with other Asian countries and boost its role in Eurasia? How does joining CICA align with Baku’s other international efforts? By addressing these questions, the paper highlights the benefits and challenges of CICA participation for Azerbaijan and explains how CICA influences its diplomatic standing in the South Caucasus and farther afield. 

Background

Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev proposed establishing CICA in 1992 to promote homegrown dialogue and cooperation among Asian countries on security issues. During a ministerial meeting in Almaty in September 1999, convened specifically for this purpose, the organization was founded through the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between the CICA Member‑States. The next significant step occurred in June 2002 with the adoption of the Almaty Act, which formalized CICA’s structure. Members decide matters by reaching consensus, and its agenda covers topics such as the economy, people, environment, and political security, emphasizing confidence‑building strategies rather than strict regulations.

Azerbaijan was among the first countries to support the CICA. Baku’s leadership publicly endorsed Nazarbayev’s initiative early on, and Azerbaijan was one of the 15 countries present at the 1999 Almaty meeting where the Declaration was signed.

Azerbaijan’s accession reflected both geopolitical and economic motives. Politically, Baku recognized the value in participating in a pan‑Asian security dialogue that could give it leverage and visibility beyond the South Caucasus.  Economically and strategically, Azerbaijan sought to capitalize on its geostrategic position as a bridge between Asia and Europe. S p e c i f i c a l l y , Azerbaijan has actively utilized CICA’s focus on c o n n e c t i v i t y , leading the “secure and effective transportation corridors” confidence‑building measure (CBM) within CICA, and working with co‑coordinators such as China and India to improve transcontinental trade routes.

Baku’s principal motivation appears to be integrating the South Caucasus into broader Asian transport and connectivity networks associated in one way or another with the Middle Corridor. Hosting CICA‑related meetings—such as an expert meeting in Baku on transport logistics in 2011 and another on digitalization in 2021—further underscores Azerbaijan’s commitment to these connectivity projects.

Strategically, joining CICA aligned with Azerbaijan’s balanced foreign policy posture. By engaging simultaneously with Asian powers through CICA (and, in a different way, through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) while maintaining ties with the EU  and the U.S., Azerbaijan diversifies its engagements. Experts highlight that Baku works actively in different regional groups: “Baku sees itself as a connectivity hub through projects such as the Baku International Sea Trade Port and the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Kars Railway, essential to the Middle Corridor shared with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI),” one has noted. These initiatives not only boost trade but have also boosted Azerbaijan’s diplomatic profile in Asia. 

Strategically, joining CICA aligned with Azerbaijan’s balanced foreign policy posture. 

Within the CICA framework, Azerbaijani officials emphasize such transport and energy linkages as sectors of leadership. Overall, from its initial involvement to the present day, Azerbaijan has been actively engaged in CICA, supporting connectivity CBMs, providing expertise, and hosting meetings. Its level of engagement has been significant: as Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov stated in 2024, Azerbaijan “will build its CICA Chairmanship on its experience as a bridge‑builder in global diplomacy, our leadership in multilateral platforms, and our firm commitment to peace, stability, and sustainable development.” 

Regional Impact

Through its CICA membership, Azerbaijan gained new diplomatic avenues to strengthen ties with key Asian countries. Baku maintains consistent engagement with Central Asian states, Türkiye, China, Russia, India, Iran, and other countries through CICA. Azerbaijan collaborated with Kazakhstan and Türkiye to improve transportation networks, resulting in the June 2022 Baku Declaration, which established a new framework for the Middle Corridor project, as discussed by the foreign minister at a CICA‑related meeting in July 2022. 

Through its CICA membership, Azerbaijan gained new diplomatic avenues to strengthen ties with key Asian countries.

Using the CICA framework, Azerbaijan’s diplomatic efforts show how it leverages the platform to coordinate trade corridor initiatives with its Turkic partners. Türkiye participates as a member of CICA and often supports Azerbaijan on energy and security issues. During CICA dialogues, both countries emphasize the importance of counterterrorism and maintaining regional stability.

Outside the Turkic realm, CICA membership facilitates communication with other Asian powers. Azerbaijan’s growing relationship with China, which has now evolved into a “comprehensive strategic partnership,” is reflected in its collaboration with CICA. Experts note how Baku’s connectivity projects, such as Alat Port and the Baku‑Tbilisi‑Kars rail corridor, align with China’s pursuit of alternative BRI routes. Joining CICA enables coordination with China and other Asian powers on transport and energy initiatives.  

Additionally, India (a CICA founder) and Pakistan have been included in transport discussions, and Azerbaijan’s cooperation with Iran (also a member) includes projects like the International North‑South Transport Corridor. The CICA platform also promotes joint efforts in renewable energy and logistics. Therefore, the CICA Secretariat recognizes Baku’s leadership in energy infrastructure and suggests that CICA could showcase Azerbaijan’s energy sector achievements.

Azerbaijan utilizes CICA as a platform to foster and showcase its relationships with various regional powers. Its role as the CICA transport CBM coordinator requires frequent consultations with co‑coordinators from China and India, as well as states pursuing corridor development. These initiatives foster additional connections with Central Asian republics and Türkiye through economic corridors while engaging East Asian powers in trade and economic growth.

Through these actions, Azerbaijan strengthens its role within regional supply networks. Azerbaijan’s role as a trade transit hub also enhances its global standing amid geopolitical shifts. Through its focus on mutual economic and security objectives with neighboring great powers, the CICA has enabled Azerbaijan to strengthen a wide range of relationships across Asia.

Regional Security Dialogues 

CICA aimed to foster closer cooperation among countries in defense and security policies. As a non‑military organization, CICA offers its members the opportunity to discuss and address both traditional and non‑traditional security challenges in a “soft” or “smart” manner, borrowing from Joseph Nye’s terminology. Being a CICA member, Azerbaijan supports the organization’s goal to confront terrorism and new risks. To illustrate this, at the Sixth CICA Summit (2022), the Action Plan reflected the UN strategy against terrorism, and CICA closely coordinates with both the UN Counter‑Terrorism Office and the SCO’s Regional Anti‑Terrorist Structure. 

Under the CICA Security Dimension, Azerbaijan is partnering with these structures by using its knowledge to cut off funding for extremists. The CICA Secretary General has highlighted Azerbaijan’s focus on cybersecurity and land disputes within the group. Azerbaijan plans to host a cybersecurity training this year and collaborate on a regional data protection plan.

Azerbaijan focuses on security issues, along with human rights and social concerns, within the scope of its CICA membership. New areas for confidence‑building have been added to CICA’s list, known as the “Catalogue,” including activities specifically designed for women, youth, and volunteers. These efforts help foster peaceful and orderly communities by promoting development and stability. Although specific dialogues regarding the South Caucasus’ territorial conflicts are not within CICA’s formal remit, Azerbaijan uses CICA to promote international law and the peaceful resolution of disputes whenever possible. In multilateral statements, Baku underscores the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity— topics aligned with CICA’s focus on the rule of law and dialogue.

In practice, however, CICA’s security role is mostly symbolic: the forum lacks enforcement mechanisms, and Azerbaijan’s military‑security interests prioritize other arrangements. Still, Azerbaijan’s involvement demonstrates its willingness to cooperate on shared Asian security issues (terrorism, cybercrime, etc.). By helping develop counterterrorism plans and suggesting new CBMs (e.g., humanitarian demining, given Azerbaijan’s mine‑affected regions), Azerbaijan supports a regional security agenda. These efforts help build regional trust and align with CICA’s confidence‑building mission, even though tangible results have been limited so far.

Caucasian Impact

CICA has had only an indirect impact on the South Caucasus as a whole. In other words, it “indirectly” influences the region’s peace issues, although none of them fall within its scope. Neither Armenia nor Georgia is a CICA member; consequently, CICA has never aimed to involve itself in conflict resolution in this part of Asia.

However, as Azerbaijan becomes more engaged with CICA, the regional dynamic has changed in several ways. First, the South Caucasus has become more directly connected to Asian markets as the Central Asian and Turkish links established through CICA projects strengthen Azerbaijan’s position. For example, the Middle Corridor facilitates the transport of Asian exports via Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe via Türkiye or the Black Sea. This enhances the strategic importance of all viable South Caucasus transit routes. For Georgia, Baku’s leadership in CICA‑related transport projects encourages even closer cooperation between Tbilisi and Baku. Therefore, CICA’s actions increasingly enable the South Caucasus to participate in Sino‑European trade, reducing the region’s reliance on any single market power.

Second, what Azerbaijan does within CICA can reshape the way the entire region connects. The way Azerbaijan recognizes regional connectivity through CICA demonstrates that it does not simply think of itself and its role as serving as a transit line, but as a “five‑star hub” (as Taleh Ziyadov has put it in these pages) and, even more ambitiously, also as a network that has a strategic opportunity to become an integral part of the CICA region’s value‑added production and export chain. As President Aliyev stated, the East‑West and North‑South corridors (frequently mentioned at CICA meetings) are of great importance to the CICA space—and beyond.

In any case, the advantage Azerbaijan gains as a CICA member is that it can aid all three South Caucasus countries in connecting more with Asian markets by strengthening regional links and by demonstrating to those who live in the South Caucasus the tangible benefits of Azerbaijan’s role as a bridge from Asia to Europe and the Gulf region and so on. Since CICA itself does not resolve local disputes, it provides Azerbaijan with a platform to showcase its regional development ideas and to pursue the “international correlations” that weave the entire South Caucasus more closely into an Asian framework.

Diversification

Azerbaijan utilizes CICA as one aspect of its increasingly diversified foreign policy portfolio. Beyond its immediate neighbors and its Western partners, membership in CICA also reflects Azerbaijan’s support for homegrown Asian multilateralism. This influences its involvement in other international organizations. For instance, Baku became an SCO dialogue partner in 2015 and applied to become an observer in 2024; it recently finished its chairmanship of the Non‑Aligned Movement, is winding down its COP29 chairmanship, and will preside over both the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) starting next year. All of this will surely feed into the CICA discussion, which will, in turn, strengthen Azerbaijan’s claim to be a global connector.

CICA reflects Azerbaijan’s support for homegrown Asian multilateralism.

By actively participating in CICA, Azerbaijan further shows that its external relations and connectivity ambitions extend beyond its immediate neighborhood. Engaging with Asia’s diverse membership helps Baku increase its visibility. Official statements highlight that Azerbaijan’s leadership of CICA will position the country as a key player in cooperation between Asian countries. As Bayramov has stated, Azerbaijan’s position as a “bridge‑builder” in global diplomacy makes it well‑suited to lead CICA.

By actively participating in CICA, Azerbaijan further shows that its external relations and connectivity ambitions extend beyond its immediate neighborhood.

In terms of concrete leverage, CICA provides another platform for Azerbaijan to raise issues of interest. For example, it offers an additional venue beyond UN, NAM, and OIC meetings to express positions on security and development. At the same time, Azerbaijan continues to manage its relations with the EU and its member states. Recent high‑level EU visits to Baku, along with positive signals from Berlin and elsewhere, demonstrate that Europeans are refocusing their interest in Azerbaijan’s energy resources and connectivity capabilities. This means CICA membership broadens Azerbaijan’s diplomatic connections in Asia and enhances its reputation in the West as a connecting partner. Ultimately, CICA helps expand Azerbaijan’s multilateral engagement, supports its independent foreign policy posture, and gives it access to the growing Asian diplomatic landscape.

Leverage and Visibility

By presiding over and actively participating in CICA, Azerbaijan increases its international profile. For instance, when Baku hosts a major CICA event, this brings Asian leaders to Azerbaijan and spreads its message across Asia’s dynamic media landscape. As CICA press releases highlight, President Aliyev’s framing of the Azerbaijani rotating chairmanship emphasizes pan‑Asian dialogue and sustainable development. The CICA Summit, scheduled to be held in Baku during Azerbaijan’s chairmanship, can, if utilized effectively, enhance Azerbaijan’s image as a potential game‑changer in Asia.

Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has been addressing these soft topics through CICA procedures. Under Baku’s leadership, CICA has been suggested to focus on societal issues. For example, CICA’s current CBM Catalogue now includes provisions for women’s empowerment, youth participation, and volunteerism. All these initiatives have been actively promoted by Azerbaijan, which hosted the Baku International Women’s Convention (2022) and is establishing a CICA Women’s Council for Female Leadership in Asia. Additionally, the first CICA Volunteers’ Summit in Baku is scheduled for this year, coinciding with UNESCO’s Year of Volunteers. This sort of program promotes Azerbaijan’s spirit of volunteerism and positions Baku as a champion of human development in Asia. 

As a result, cultural and educational diplomacy are being bolstered. Azerbaijan is coordinating a CICA Partner Network of universities and is considering including science and education in CICA’s CBM Catalogue. Through this effort, Azerbaijani higher education institutions are connecting with other institutions in Asia. (During Azerbaijan’s CICA chairmanship, ADA University serves as the Chair of the Coordination Council of the Partnership Network of Leading Universities of the CICA Member States (PNLU), which aims to enhance academic and scientific exchanges between member states to advance CICA’s human dimension activities further.) A different approach connects environment and energy: Azerbaijan hosted COP29 in 2024 and now seeks to leverage CICA as a platform for a regional green agenda, proposing an environmental council to foster cooperation on climate change across Asia.

In summary, Azerbaijan’s CICA chairmanship transforms “soft” aspects—such as culture, youth, and environmental cooperation—into channels that enhance the country’s standing. By integrating Azerbaijan’s internal achievements (in education, gender equality, and climate) into the CICA framework, it strategically augments the country’s diplomatic prominence. Observers have noted that these significant contributions lead to “tangible benefits” and foster genuine “mutual understanding” among people.

Overall, CICA enhances Azerbaijan’s soft power by enabling it to take a leading role in setting standards for specific social and developmental issues that are unique to Asia.

Influence and Agenda Setting 

Through its chairmanship and active diplomatic posture, Azerbaijan is shaping CICA’s policy agenda in line with its strategic interests. It offers an ambitious program based on institutional reforms and sectoral cooperation. Official statements outline three main priorities for its chairmanship: making CICA a more institutionalized organization, enhancing connectivity and transport cooperation, and promoting sustainable development, which encompasses digitalization and a green economy.

Through its chairmanship and active diplomatic posture, Azerbaijan is shaping CICA’s policy agenda in line with its strategic interests. 

A tangible goal is to adopt a Charter at the 2026 summit, which would define the organization’s legal status and strengthen its Secretariat. This translates into the convening of expert meetings to draft such a document, giving weight to Baku’s plan to institutionalize CICA’s framework.

In terms of sectoral cooperation, Azerbaijan’s chairmanship focuses on transport, energy, and technology. Baku has suggested various initiatives in these areas, including a CICA Port Leaders Conference to enhance multimodal infrastructure, a meeting on Digital Transformation and Innovation, and summits on agriculture and tourism. These projects reflect Azerbaijan’s development agenda (e.g., developing the Alat port, promoting ICT and renewable energy. Baku has also championed an environmental council (informed by experience gained during its COP29  presidency) and plans to share best practices on demining (a major post‑conflict issue for Azerbaijan), as noted above. In diplomacy, Azerbaijan is working to expand CICA’s partnerships by supporting memoranda with the UN, ECO, SCO, and other organizations to coordinate efforts on anti‑terrorism, climate action, and trade issues.

By driving these initiatives, Azerbaijan seems to be gaining agenda‑setting leverage within CICA. For example, the theme of the 2024 CICA Council was “Stronger CICA, Connectivity, Digitalization, and Sustainable Growth in Asia,” a formulation proposed by Azerbaijan. As chair, Baku secures key positions (e.g., coordinators of transportation CBMs) that enable it to convene discussions and draft action plans. These roles allow Azerbaijan to project its policy interests and priorities onto a pan‑Asian stage. In effect, Baku is using CICA to legitimize and internationalize initiatives that advance both its regional development goals (e.g., the Middle Corridor) and broader objectives.

CICA vs. Other Platforms 

Azerbaijan participates in multiple regional organizations, each with a different scope. Compared to the SCO, CICA has a broader membership but less institutional depth. Led by China and Russia, the SCO is a security‑oriented organization with a standing anti‑terror apparatus and greater economic integration.

By contrast, CICA is more of a consultative forum, addressing a wider range of issues through a consensus‑based approach, channeled through the CICA Catalogue of CBMs across what the relevant document calls “five dimensions of cooperation with 18 priority areas,” namely: military‑political dimension; new challenges and threats (combating terrorism, ICT security, combating illicit drugs, epidemiological safety, public health and pharmaceuticals); economic dimension (small and medium enterprises development, energy security, information technology, tourism, secure transportation corridors, agriculture, finance, trade and investment); environmental dimension (sustainable development, natural disaster management, environmental protection); and human dimension.

One scholar has noted that both CICA and the SCO “play crucial roles in fostering cooperation and addressing security concerns in Asia.” Still, the SCO’s approach is driven by its founding powers, whereas CICA emphasizes inclusive dialogue. For Azerbaijan, engagement with the SCO offers tangible security cooperation, while CICA affords broader diplomatic engagement with countries that are and are not in the SCO.

The OTS is another key forum for Azerbaijan. A culturally and ethnolinguistically focused organization, President Aliyev stated in his most recent inaugural address that the OTS is “the main international organization for us because it is our family. We have no other family. Our family is the Turkic world.” 

OTS tends to champion projects reflecting the shared Turkic heritage of its members (the Baku‑TbilisiKars railway was an OTS flagship) and has a strong identity‑building role for its member and observer states. In comparison, CICA is non‑identitarian and covers all of Asia. OTS cooperation typically runs parallel to Azerbaijan’s bilateral ties with Türkiye and the Central Asian states, while CICA connects Azerbaijan to a much broader pan‑Asian community of nations.

Thus, while OTS strengthens Azerbaijan’s regional identity among Turkic peoples, CICA positions it as an Asian state in constant touch with the others.

The EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) represents a different orientation. It links Azerbaijan (and five other former Soviet states) with the European Union on political and economic reforms. The EaP has been useful for promoting trade and energy (e.g., Southern Gas Corridor) with the EU, but less so for seeking to get Azerbaijan to align with EU “values” and norms and so on. Progress has thus been uneven, and relations have had their ups and downs, depending on the outcome of intra‑EU deliberations and fluctuations in the EU Commission’s process of rank‑ordering priorities. Recently, the EU has renewed its interest in Azerbaijan as an energy partner, in line with a more focused approach to the terms outlined in the July 2022 Memorandum of Understanding between Baku and Brussels on the strategic energy partnership between the two parties. 

CICA, by contrast, has no Western‑style conditionality and does not—by design—pressure any state (member or not) to implement political reforms. It provides Azerbaijan with a stable and predictable alternative form of multilateral engagement, far outside the EU’s preferred frameworks. In terms of effectiveness, the EaP does deliver significant aid and market access, whereas CICA offers fewer tangible benefits and is less prominent in Western media. For identity‑building purposes, the EaP could act as an anchor to bring Azerbaijan closer to “Europe” (similar to the Council of Europe’s approach in some ways). Meanwhile, CICA signals an “Asian identity” or at least acknowledges Asia’s role in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.

CICA complements these other platforms in an essentially frictionless manner. Admittedly, it has limited enforcement capacity, but that is not its purpose. CICA is also more open and diverse in its membership and the issues it addresses than the SCO. Unlike the OTS (an exclusive cultural bloc) or the EaP (an obviously Western project), CICA encompasses the entire Asian continent without ideological limitations.

Azerbaijan’s active participation in all these organizations—CICA, SCO, OTS, EaP—demonstrates its intent to straddle multiple spheres. Each platform promotes different objectives: CICA expands Asian cooperation, the SCO strengthens security connections (as does engagement in PfP), the OTS enhances Turkic solidarity, and the EaP links it to Europe. Compared to others, CICA is less targeted but more inclusive, making it a distinctively Asian forum that complements Azerbaijan’s other efforts.

Challenges and Limitations 

Although CICA may offer significant potential benefits, it is hindered by observable limitations. It remains an informal forum without expansive budgetary allocations or enforcement powers. Membership actions remain voluntary, and there is no rapid‑response mechanism for crises. As the CICA Ministerial Council itself noted in 2024, CICA “remains a unique, comprehensive intergovernmental forum” based on consensus—this wording underscores its consultative nature. In practice, CICA’s initiatives are often general declarations rather than binding decisions. This limits the tangible impact of Azerbaijan’s participation: ambitious plans (like a CICA Charter or new councils) could take years to come to fruition.

CICA’s visibility remains relatively low compared to other organizations. Internationally, it garners little media coverage outside Asia, so Azerbaijan’s chairmanship does not automatically translate into enhanced global prestige. There is also some overlap with other groupings. For example, the SCO and the Economic Cooperation Organization address many security and economic issues that CICA also covers, and the OTS overlaps in transport and cultural projects.

Therefore, while Azerbaijan actively works to transform CICA, Baku recognizes that progress is likely to be gradual. However, this should not be interpreted to mean that CICA will never develop into a strong organization over time. But it does indicate that at present, no CICA member considers the organization their main multilateral point of engagement.

Bridging Aspirations and Realities 

Azerbaijan’s active engagement within the CICA framework has opened new opportunities for diversifying its external engagement. Supporters of strengthening the country’s pan‑Asian linkages have welcomed the news from Baku: CICA has expanded Azerbaijan’s diplomatic reach across Asia, allowing the country to present a modern and responsible image to a new audience. It has also lent further credence to the prudence of Azerbaijan’s decision to follow an independent (or multivector or balanced) foreign policy strategy.

At the same time, since CICA remains, at its core, an informal and nonbinding group, Azerbaijan cannot rely on it to secure significant and dependable security guarantees. The broad, voluntary nature of CICA’s agenda, along with its overlap with other organizations, highlights its current institutional limitations. Nonetheless, deepening relationships through the CICA platform constitutes a notable achievement in itself. However, for Azerbaijan, much of the progress, especially tangible advancements, still mainly comes from bilateral partnerships or other multilateral fora.

The bottom line is that Azerbaijan’s participation in CICA has not produced strategically game‑changing outcomes. But it has played a large role in consolidating Azerbaijan’s status among Asian countries. It has also provided a new and complimentary channel for Baku’s diplomatic outreach, but it cannot serve as a substitute for other types of multilateral engagement.

Looking ahead, we can expect more cooperation between Azerbaijan and CICA in areas of mutual practical benefit (e.g., transport, energy, and information technology). The completion of the CICA Charter and procedural updates could strengthen the institution’s credibility in the longer term. As Bayramov has stated, Azerbaijan’s work at CICA should focus on “connectivity, digitalization, and sustainable growth in Asia.” By prioritizing these practical goals, Azerbaijan can fully leverage CICA as a valuable instrument of its foreign policy.